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  • Congressional Oversight Panel's Final Report

    When Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the fall of 2008, it also established the Congressional Oversight Panel to keep an eye on the Treasury 's actions, and effectiveness, in meting out TARP dollars. On April 3, COP will close up shop, as mandated in the legislation that created TARP. From October 2008 on, COP has released a monthly report on TARP actions. The 30 reports provide a compelling historical record of TARP, and of the federal government's response to the Global Economic Crisis. This final report is a comprehensive one--a summary of Treasury's efforts. And it reads as a tough-but-fair report: In order to evaluate the TARP‘s impact, one must first recall the extreme fear and uncertainty that infected the financial system in late 2008. The stock market had endured triple digit swings. Major financial institutions, including Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers, had collapsed, sowing panic throughout the financial markets. The economy was hemorrhaging jobs, and foreclosures were escalating with no end in sight. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has said that the nation was on course for "a cataclysm that could have rivaled or surpassed the Great Depression." It is now clear that, although America has endured a wrenching recession, it has not experienced a second Great Depression. The TARP does not deserve full credit for this outcome, but it provided critical support to markets at a moment of profound uncertainty. It achieved this effect in part by providing capital to banks but, more significantly, by demonstrating that the United States would take any action necessary to prevent the collapse of its financial system. Some of the more interesting themes of the report include the public stigma that COP says "burdened" the Treasury Department: Because the TARP was designed for an inherently unpopular purpose - rescuing Wall Street banks from the consequences of their own actions - stigmatization was likely inevitable. Treasury's implementation of the program has, however, made this stigma worse. For example, Treasury initially insisted that only healthy banks would be eligible for capital infusions under the CPP. When it later became clear that some TARP-recipient banks were in fact on the brink of failure, all participating banks, even those in comparatively strong condition, became tainted in the public eye. Further, many senior managers of TARP-recipient institutions maintained their jobs and their substantial salaries, and although shareholders often suffered meaningful dilution, they were not wiped out. To the public, this may appear to be evidence that Wall Street banks and bankers can retain their profits in boom years and shift their losses to taxpayers during a bust - an arrangement that is anathema to market discipline in a free economy. And transparency (or lack thereof): Beginning with its very first report, the Panel has repeatedly expressed concerns about the lack of transparency in the TARP. In too many cases, especially in late 2008 and early 2009, Treasury either declined to release information that it possessed about the program or declined to require TARP-recipient institutions to reveal information about their use of taxpayer funds. In perhaps the most profound violation of the principle of transparency, Treasury decided in the TARP's earliest days to push tens of billions of dollars out the door to very large financial institutions without requiring banks to use the funds in any particular way or even reveal how the money was used. As a result, the public will never know to what purpose its money was put. Other transparency problems include Treasury's refusal to explain how it valued the stock warrants it received in exchange for its TARP investments and the joint failure of Treasury and the Federal Reserve to disclose enough details of the 2009 stress tests to permit the results to be duplicated or challenged by outside parties. Read the full report here . Here is COP Chair Ted Kaufman introducing and summarizing the final report:

  • COP June Report: The AIG Rescue

    The Congressional Oversight Panel 's June Report is now out, and in it the members of the panel are critical of the federal government's rescue of AIG in September, 2008. First, the panel argues that the Hank Paulson led Treasury Department did not do its due diligence in examining all the options it had before it committed $85 billion of taxpayer funds to keep the insurance giant from collapsing. But their bigger criticism comes with the actual rescue plan, which COP members say shifted the burden of AIG's failings from its creditors to all taxpayers and "distorted the marketplace by transforming highly risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations." From the report: In the ordinary course of business, the costs of AIG‟s inability to meet its derivative obligations would have been borne entirely by AIG‟s shareholders and creditors under the well-established rules of bankruptcy. But rather than sharing the pain among AIG‟s creditors – an outcome that would have maintained the market discipline associated with credit risks – the government instead shifted those costs in full onto taxpayers out of a belief that demanding sacrifice from creditors would have destabilized the markets. The result was that the government backed up the entire derivatives market, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts. One consequence of this approach was that every counterparty received exactly the same deal: a complete rescue at taxpayer expense. Among the beneficiaries of this rescue were parties whom taxpayers might have been willing to support, such as pension funds for retired workers and individual insurance policy holders. But the across-the-board rescue also benefitted far less sympathetic players, such as sophisticated investors who had profited handsomely from playing a risky game and who had no reason to expect that they would be paid in full in the event of AIG‟s failure. Other beneficiaries included foreign banks that were dependent on contracts with AIG to maintain required regulatory capital reserves. Some of those same banks were also counterparties to other AIG CDSs. Here is COP chair Elizabeth Warren discussing the key findings of the June report: Read the full report here .

  • COP January Report: Time For a Clear Plan to Unwind TARP

    In December, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced that his department is extending the Troubled Assets Relief Program through October 3, 2010. So with less than ten months to go, part of the Treasury's responsibility will be to manage the end of TARP. But as the Congressional Oversight Panel's January report points out, the impact of TARP will be felt for long after October. And in their January report, the COP members call on Treasury to be more transparent in the department's effort to "unwind its stake in the financial markets": As Treasury enters the next stage of its administration of the TARP, it must learn from the mistakes it has made in the past – in particular, its failure to follow the money used to bail out large financial institutions. Because Treasury never required the institutions that received the first infusions of TARP funding to account for their use of these funds, taxpayers have not had a clear understanding of how their money has been used. As Treasury embarks on new programs, it must require that future recipients provide much greater disclosure of their use of TARP dollars. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the TARP has raised the long-term challenge of how best to eliminate implicit guarantees. Belief remains widespread in the marketplace that, if the economy once again approaches the brink of collapse, the federal government will inevitably rush in to rescue financial institutions deemed too big to fail. This belief distorts prices, giving large financial institutions an advantage in raising capital that mid-sized and smaller banks – those not too big to fail – do not enjoy. These implicit guarantees also encourage major financial institutions to take unreasonable risks out of the belief that, no matter what happens, taxpayers will not allow their failure. So long as markets continue to believe that an implicit guarantee exists, moral hazard will continue to distort prices and endanger the nation’s economy, even after the last TARP program has been closed and the last TARP dollar has been repaid. Here is COP Chair Elizabeth Warren discussing the January report: Read the full report here .

  • COP November Report: Government Guarantees in TARP and the Costs and Benefits to American Taxpayers

    When the Treasury introduced the Troubled Assets Relief Program late last year, the government guaranteed the values of hundreds of billions of dollars in bank assets. The move was made, to put it very simply, to prevent a panic and protect the assets of millions of American taxpayers. The Congressional Oversight Panel , in its November report, concludes that the federal guarantees did that successfully. But the report also shows that the guarantees now account for the "single largest element of the government's response to the financial crisis," and that raises some timely questions for Treasury: These guarantee programs also created significant moral hazard. Guarantees create price distortions and can lead market participants to engage in riskier behavior than they otherwise would. In addition to the explicit guarantees analyzed in the Panel's report, the government's broader economic stabilization effort may have signaled an implicit guarantee to the marketplace: the American taxpayer stands ready to provide a financial backstop for certain markets and large market players to avert possible economic collapse. To the degree that investors, lenders and borrowers believe that such an implicit guarantee remains in effect, moral hazard will continue to distort the market. The extraordinary scale of these guarantees, the significant risk to taxpayers, and the corresponding moral hazard leads the Panel to conclude that these programs should be subject to extraordinary transparency. The Panel specifically identified the guarantee of Citigroup assets under AGP -- the largest single guarantee offered to date -- and strongly urges Treasury to provide regular, detailed disclosures about the status of the assets backing up this guarantee. Treasury should disclose greater detail about the rationale behind guarantee programs, the alternatives that may have been available and why they were not chosen, and whether these programs have achieved their objectives. This should include an analysis of why Citigroup and Bank of America were selected for AGP and not others. Here is COP Chair Elizabeth Warren introducing the November report: You can read the full report here .

  • Andrew Ross Sorkin on Lehman's Fuld, and 'Too Big to Fail'

    New York Times writer Andrew Ross Sorkin 's Too Big to Fail: Wall Street's Near-Death Experience is t he too-important-to-ignore book of the moment. The details about Hank Paulson's interactions with executives from his old firm, Goldman Sachs, when he was Secretary of the Treasury are getting a lot of attention ( from Felix Salmon, for example ). And Sorkin's detailed account of the government's efforts to broker a deal to merge Goldman Sachs and Wachovia after Lehman Brothers failed last September is another highlight (you can read an excerpt of the book that covers this at Vanity Fair ). Sorkin spoke about these and other hot topics from the book with Charlie Ros e. Here's an excerpt in which Sorkin talks about former Lehman CEO Richard Fuld: Watch the full interview here .

  • 12 Months of TARP Funds

    This weekend marked 12 months since the Treasury Department launched the Troubled Assets Relief Program. In that time, nearly $450 billion of the $700 billion in TARP funds have been distributed. Here's a look at how much money has flowed to whom: (H/T CNN Money's David Goldman and his article TARP: Taxpayers on the hook for $200 billion .)

  • COP's June Report: Stress Tests Were 'Reasonable,' May Need to be Repeated

    In its June report, the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) gives the Treasury Department's "stress tests" a passing grade, though not exactly high marks. And the panel warns that "serious concerns remain," and offers these recommendations: highlights the importance of America’s small businesses to the country’s overall economic well being: -The unemployment rate climbed to 9.4% in May, bringing the average unemployment rate for 2009 to 8.5%. If the monthly rate continues to increase, the 2009 average may exceed the 8.9% assumed under the more adverse scenario, suggesting that the stress tests should be repeated if that occurs. -Stress testing should also be repeated so long as banks continue to hold large amounts of toxic assets on their books. -Between formal tests conducted by the regulators, banks should be required to run internal stress tests and should share the results with regulators. -Regulators should have the ability to use stress tests in the future when they believe that doing so would help to promote a healthy banking system. COP chair Elizabeth Warren explains the panel's approach to evaluating the stress tests by comparing them to the types of questions American families are asking with regard to their own financial standing during the recession: Read the full report here .

  • James Baker's Advice on Fixing the Banks

    James Baker was Treasury Secretary in the Reagan Administration, and Chief of Staff and Secretary of State for George H.W. Bush. And when he looks at the trouble in the US banking sector, he says we are "in danger of making the same mistakes the Japanese made" in the late 1980s. In this interview with Judy Woodruff , he says the federal government, and current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, need to be thinking not just of "liquidity," but of "solvency."