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  • COP June Report: The AIG Rescue

    The Congressional Oversight Panel 's June Report is now out, and in it the members of the panel are critical of the federal government's rescue of AIG in September, 2008. First, the panel argues that the Hank Paulson led Treasury Department did not do its due diligence in examining all the options it had before it committed $85 billion of taxpayer funds to keep the insurance giant from collapsing. But their bigger criticism comes with the actual rescue plan, which COP members say shifted the burden of AIG's failings from its creditors to all taxpayers and "distorted the marketplace by transforming highly risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations." From the report: In the ordinary course of business, the costs of AIG‟s inability to meet its derivative obligations would have been borne entirely by AIG‟s shareholders and creditors under the well-established rules of bankruptcy. But rather than sharing the pain among AIG‟s creditors – an outcome that would have maintained the market discipline associated with credit risks – the government instead shifted those costs in full onto taxpayers out of a belief that demanding sacrifice from creditors would have destabilized the markets. The result was that the government backed up the entire derivatives market, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts. One consequence of this approach was that every counterparty received exactly the same deal: a complete rescue at taxpayer expense. Among the beneficiaries of this rescue were parties whom taxpayers might have been willing to support, such as pension funds for retired workers and individual insurance policy holders. But the across-the-board rescue also benefitted far less sympathetic players, such as sophisticated investors who had profited handsomely from playing a risky game and who had no reason to expect that they would be paid in full in the event of AIG‟s failure. Other beneficiaries included foreign banks that were dependent on contracts with AIG to maintain required regulatory capital reserves. Some of those same banks were also counterparties to other AIG CDSs. Here is COP chair Elizabeth Warren discussing the key findings of the June report: Read the full report here .

  • COP March Oversight Report Finds Flaws with GMAC Bailout

    In its March report, the Congressional Oversight Panel takes the Treasury Department to task for a "missed opportunities to to increase accountability and better protect taxpayers money," as it "rescued" GMAC. Treasury did not, for example, condition access to TARP money on the same sweeping changes that it required from GM and Chrysler: it did not wipe out GMAC’s equity holders; nor did it require GMAC to create a viable plan for returning to profitability; nor did it require a detailed, public explanation of how the company would use taxpayer funds to increase consumer lending. Moreover, the Panel remains unconvinced that bankruptcy was not a viable option in 2008. In connection with the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, Treasury might have been able to orchestrate a strategic bankruptcy for GMAC. This bankruptcy could have preserved GMAC’s automotive lending functions while winding down its other, less significant operations, dealing with the ongoing liabilities of the mortgage lending operations, and putting the company on sounder economic footing. The Panel is also concerned that Treasury has not given due consideration to the possibility of merging GMAC back into GM, a step which would restore GM’s financing operations to the model generally shared by other automotive manufacturers, thus strengthening GM and eliminating other money-losing operations. COP Chair Elizabeth Warren dsicusses the report's findings: You can read the full report here .

  • Paulson on Pushing For TARP Against Reluctant Politicians

    Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has a new book out in which he gives his first-hand account of what transpired during the near economic collapse of 2008. And with the release of On The Brink , Paulson is becoming a public figure again. He is getting a lot of screen time with CNBC this week, after giving Steve Liesman an interview over the weekend. Here is an excerpt of that interview, in which Paulson discusses pushing for TARP with certain political figures: Read the transcript for Liesman's interview with Paulson here .

  • COP January Report: Time For a Clear Plan to Unwind TARP

    In December, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced that his department is extending the Troubled Assets Relief Program through October 3, 2010. So with less than ten months to go, part of the Treasury's responsibility will be to manage the end of TARP. But as the Congressional Oversight Panel's January report points out, the impact of TARP will be felt for long after October. And in their January report, the COP members call on Treasury to be more transparent in the department's effort to "unwind its stake in the financial markets": As Treasury enters the next stage of its administration of the TARP, it must learn from the mistakes it has made in the past – in particular, its failure to follow the money used to bail out large financial institutions. Because Treasury never required the institutions that received the first infusions of TARP funding to account for their use of these funds, taxpayers have not had a clear understanding of how their money has been used. As Treasury embarks on new programs, it must require that future recipients provide much greater disclosure of their use of TARP dollars. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the TARP has raised the long-term challenge of how best to eliminate implicit guarantees. Belief remains widespread in the marketplace that, if the economy once again approaches the brink of collapse, the federal government will inevitably rush in to rescue financial institutions deemed too big to fail. This belief distorts prices, giving large financial institutions an advantage in raising capital that mid-sized and smaller banks – those not too big to fail – do not enjoy. These implicit guarantees also encourage major financial institutions to take unreasonable risks out of the belief that, no matter what happens, taxpayers will not allow their failure. So long as markets continue to believe that an implicit guarantee exists, moral hazard will continue to distort prices and endanger the nation’s economy, even after the last TARP program has been closed and the last TARP dollar has been repaid. Here is COP Chair Elizabeth Warren discussing the January report: Read the full report here .

  • New Push to Control Executive Pay; Grading Past Efforts

    According to the New York Times , the Obama Administration is going to require banks and corporations that receieved federal bailout money to clear any changes in its pay for top management with Kenneth Feinberg --the administration's new "pay czar." The proposal is part of a broad set of regulations on executive compensation expected to be announced by the administration as early as this week. Some of the rules are required by legislation enacted in the wake of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression , and they would apply only to companies that received taxpayer money. Others, which are being described as broad principles, would set standards that the government would like the entire financial industry to observe as banks and other companies compensate their highest-paid executives, though it is not clear how stringent regulators will make them. This is not the first time the federal government has tried to regulate executive pay. Joann Lublin , management news editor for the Wall Street Journal , recounts some past efforts, and says "the record is not a very good one":