• Public Debt Data, 1880-2008

    IMF researchers S. M. Ali Abbas , Nazim Belhocine , Asmaa El-Ganainy , and Mark Horton are trying to make the task of studying debt cycles and debt sustainability easier. They have begun building a database of historical public debt. At VoxEU , they have posted a series of interesting graphs from the data they have compiled so far. Including this one, that they say provides an "historical perspective of debt developments in advanced, emerging, and low-income economies. Debt levels in advanced economies (now the G20) averaged 55% of GDP over 1880–2009, with a number of peaks and troughs that correspond with key historical events along the way.": Here is what the authors say about the value of this data moving forward: The composition of the 11 debt reductions observed during 1880–1914, the first era of financial globalisation, is quite similar to that witnessed in the post-1970 financially liberalised period. In both cases, the debt ratio reductions were mainly caused by large primary surpluses. In fact, the post-1970s debt reductions are accounted for almost entirely by primary surplus improvements. However, insofar as such improvements are boosted by the cycle and easier to implement in the context of strong growth, these results may somewhat understate the true role of growth in debt declines; strong growth was a consistent feature of most debt decline episodes.2 That conventional fiscal adjustment and growth have led the way in periods of global financial integration is intuitive as well as consistent with previous studies (such as IMF 2010). Looking ahead, highly indebted advanced economies are confronted by a challenging landscape. The pursuit of unconventional options – such as reverting to financial repression policies akin to those taken during the post-WWII years, reducing the burden of domestic debt through higher inflation, or restructuring – may be a temptingshortcut but it comes with high costs. A gradual but steady adjustment is the right way to go. History shows an orderly adjustment is much easier in the context of sustained medium-term growth. This suggests that there is a premium on both implementing structural measures that improve competitiveness and the business environment, and designing fiscal adjustment in a manner that minimises the drag on growth. Read Lessons from a century of large public debt reductions and build-ups here .
  • Uncertainty in Europe over the Effects of Greek Default

    We are seeing more signs today of a pending Greek default . While some folks just want resolution , European policymakers in Germany and elsewhere may be delaying the inevitable in part because they are not yet certain of what the ripple effect of default will be. Dow Jones columnist Alen Mattich discusses the uncertainty throughout Europe:
  • China's Growing Debt

    China's economy continues to thrive compared to others around the globe. The growth rate for the third quarter was near 9%. Great returns for 2009, and the near future looks even brighter to most economists and investors. But at Fortune/CNNMoney.com , Bill Powell writes of some concerns over China's escalating debt. According to Powell, the Chinese government has issued massive loans to boost infrastructure, manufacturing, and real estate. The loans total $1.27 trillion, "up 136% from the same period last year." According to a recent analysis by Monaco-based hedge fund Pivot Capital Management, China's total lending reached 140% of GDP at midyear. That kind of lending makes China an "outlier" compared with other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries -- and is already well beyond the levels that "have led to sharp and brief credit crises in the past," the Pivot Capital report contends. Moreover, an increasing number of Chinese loans are being funneled into projects unlikely to generate an attractive economic return. From 2000 to 2008 it took just $1.50 in new credit to generate $1 of GDP growth. Now that ratio is 7 to 1. (In the U.S., just before the financial crisis hit, the ratio was only 4 to 1.) That's because the loans are creating huge amounts of manufacturing capacity -- which is unneeded in the bears' view. China's spare capacity in the cement industry, for example, equals the total annual consumption in the U.S., Japan, and India combined. So where will the growth come from? China's export markets are tapped out. Its domestic consumption, stalled at around a third of GDP, hasn't yet started to rise significantly. Additional manufacturing investment would be crazy, leading arguably to a global deflationary bust of epic proportions. Read the full article here .