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The Congressional Oversight Panel 's June Report is now out, and in it the members of the panel are critical of the federal government's rescue of AIG in September, 2008. First, the panel argues that the Hank Paulson led Treasury Department did not do its due diligence in examining all the options it had before it committed $85 billion of taxpayer funds to keep the insurance giant from collapsing. But their bigger criticism comes with the actual rescue plan, which COP members say shifted the burden of AIG's failings from its creditors to all taxpayers and "distorted the marketplace by transforming highly risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations." From the report: In the ordinary course of business, the costs of AIG‟s inability to meet its derivative obligations would have been borne entirely by AIG‟s shareholders and creditors under the well-established rules of bankruptcy. But rather than sharing the pain among AIG‟s creditors – an outcome that would have maintained the market discipline associated with credit risks – the government instead shifted those costs in full onto taxpayers out of a belief that demanding sacrifice from creditors would have destabilized the markets. The result was that the government backed up the entire derivatives market, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts. One consequence of this approach was that every counterparty received exactly the same deal: a complete rescue at taxpayer expense. Among the beneficiaries of this rescue were parties whom taxpayers might have been willing to support, such as pension funds for retired workers and individual insurance policy holders. But the across-the-board rescue also benefitted far less sympathetic players, such as sophisticated investors who had profited handsomely from playing a risky game and who had no reason to expect that they would be paid in full in the event of AIG‟s failure. Other beneficiaries included foreign banks that were dependent on contracts with AIG to maintain required regulatory capital reserves. Some of those same banks were also counterparties to other AIG CDSs. Here is COP chair Elizabeth Warren discussing the key findings of the June report: Read the full report here .

There has been much discussion of the bank bailout funds this week--and some of it is good news for those who want financial insitutions to start giving back. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan want to repay their TARP money. And earlier this week Treasury Secretary Geithner says he expects $25 billion of the TARP funds to be repaid by the end of the year. So where does that money go? According to The Explainer -- Slate 's Christopher Beam --the money goes back into the program: If a bank wants to return its TARP money, it gets siphoned back—by wire, usually—into the original pool. In his testimony, Geithner said there's $110 billion left of the original $700 billion allocated by the TARP program. So once the expected $25 billion is returned, the remaining stash should reach $135 billion. The return of the money seems like a good thing all around. But The Explainer points out there is a downside: Of course, there are risks to letting the banks return money. One is that they'll need it again, which would create a public relations snafu. Then there's a systemic risk problem: If one bank appears stronger than others, the weaker ones might get hurt as investors yank their money, and short sellers bet against them. That's why Geithner is insisting on completing the stress test—which measures the banks' strength—before deciding which big companies get to return their money. Read The Explainer's full explanation here . And track the returned money at Slate's Tarp-O-Meter here .