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The Wall Street Journal reports that European stocks "plunged" today, "as investors worried the world's largest economy may be heading for a recession." This news reminds us that the US is not alone in its struggle to restart significant economic growth. And the problems in Europe continue to have their own dire consequences. On the latest Planet Money podcast, Columbia finance professor David Beim laid out some possible worst-case scenarios for the Eurozone and Europe: So the end of the Euro, riots, bank runs? How likely are these scenarios? What do you see as the worst-case scenario? What do you see as the most likely scenario for Europe?

When Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the fall of 2008, it also established the Congressional Oversight Panel to keep an eye on the Treasury 's actions, and effectiveness, in meting out TARP dollars. On April 3, COP will close up shop, as mandated in the legislation that created TARP. From October 2008 on, COP has released a monthly report on TARP actions. The 30 reports provide a compelling historical record of TARP, and of the federal government's response to the Global Economic Crisis. This final report is a comprehensive one--a summary of Treasury's efforts. And it reads as a tough-but-fair report: In order to evaluate the TARP‘s impact, one must first recall the extreme fear and uncertainty that infected the financial system in late 2008. The stock market had endured triple digit swings. Major financial institutions, including Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers, had collapsed, sowing panic throughout the financial markets. The economy was hemorrhaging jobs, and foreclosures were escalating with no end in sight. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has said that the nation was on course for "a cataclysm that could have rivaled or surpassed the Great Depression." It is now clear that, although America has endured a wrenching recession, it has not experienced a second Great Depression. The TARP does not deserve full credit for this outcome, but it provided critical support to markets at a moment of profound uncertainty. It achieved this effect in part by providing capital to banks but, more significantly, by demonstrating that the United States would take any action necessary to prevent the collapse of its financial system. Some of the more interesting themes of the report include the public stigma that COP says "burdened" the Treasury Department: Because the TARP was designed for an inherently unpopular purpose - rescuing Wall Street banks from the consequences of their own actions - stigmatization was likely inevitable. Treasury's implementation of the program has, however, made this stigma worse. For example, Treasury initially insisted that only healthy banks would be eligible for capital infusions under the CPP. When it later became clear that some TARP-recipient banks were in fact on the brink of failure, all participating banks, even those in comparatively strong condition, became tainted in the public eye. Further, many senior managers of TARP-recipient institutions maintained their jobs and their substantial salaries, and although shareholders often suffered meaningful dilution, they were not wiped out. To the public, this may appear to be evidence that Wall Street banks and bankers can retain their profits in boom years and shift their losses to taxpayers during a bust - an arrangement that is anathema to market discipline in a free economy. And transparency (or lack thereof): Beginning with its very first report, the Panel has repeatedly expressed concerns about the lack of transparency in the TARP. In too many cases, especially in late 2008 and early 2009, Treasury either declined to release information that it possessed about the program or declined to require TARP-recipient institutions to reveal information about their use of taxpayer funds. In perhaps the most profound violation of the principle of transparency, Treasury decided in the TARP's earliest days to push tens of billions of dollars out the door to very large financial institutions without requiring banks to use the funds in any particular way or even reveal how the money was used. As a result, the public will never know to what purpose its money was put. Other transparency problems include Treasury's refusal to explain how it valued the stock warrants it received in exchange for its TARP investments and the joint failure of Treasury and the Federal Reserve to disclose enough details of the 2009 stress tests to permit the results to be duplicated or challenged by outside parties. Read the full report here . Here is COP Chair Ted Kaufman introducing and summarizing the final report:

If the purchasing of Super Bowl ads is any indication, then the market for cars is much brighter than years past. And two US automakers--GM and Chrysler--that were on the verge of collapse two years ago are among the big spenders this year, according to the Detroit Free Press . So does this mean the Treasury's so-called bailouts of GM and Chrysler were clear successes? Maybe, maybe not, seems to be the answer from the Congressional Oversight Panel (tasked with evaluating the Treasury's handling of TARP funds). From the January COP report: Treasury is currently unwinding its stakes in GM, Chrysler, and GMAC/Ally Financial. Of those companies, GM is furthest along in the process of repaying taxpayers. It conducted an initial public offering (IPO) on November 18, 2010, and Treasury used the occasion to sell a portion of its GM holdings for $13.5 billion. This sale represents a major recovery of taxpayer funds, but it is important to note that Treasury received a price of $33.00 per share - well below the $44.59 needed to be on track to recover fully taxpayers‟ money. By selling stock for less than this break-even price, Treasury essentially "locked in" a loss of billions of dollars and thus greatly reduced the likelihood that taxpayers will ever be repaid in full. Treasury has explained its decision to sell at a loss by saying that it wished to unwind government ownership of the automobile industry as quickly as possible. This justification may very well be reasonable, but it is difficult to evaluate. Because Treasury has cited different, conflicting goals for its automotive interventions at different times - saying, for example, that it wished to save American jobs, to produce the best possible return to taxpayers, or to return the company to private ownership as rapidly as possible - it is difficult for the Panel or any outside observer to judge whether Treasury‟s results in fact qualify as successful. Read the full report here . And watch COP Chair Ted Kaufman introduce the report:

The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) may have expired at the beginning of the month, but the Congressional Oversight Panel --which was tasked with serving as a congressional watchdog over Treasury action--still has work to do. The latest monthly COP report focusses on Treasury's use of outside contractors in administering TARP. The practice comes under scrutiny largely because it may limit the degree to which the Treasury's actions are transparent to the general public (this is not the first time COP has shared concern about transparency issues). From the report: In general, Treasury has taken significant steps to ensure that it has used private contractors appropriately, and indeed some experts have praised Treasury for going above and beyond the usual standards for government contracting. Treasury provided for competitive bidding for most of its contracts, and it has established several layers of controls to monitor contractor performance and to prevent conflicts of interest. Further, despite the pressing needs of the financial crisis, Treasury complied with the FAR, although it could have waived its provisions. This praise must be viewed in context, however. The government contracting process is notoriously nontransparent, and although Treasury appears to have performed well on a comparative basis, significant transparency concerns remain. For example, contractors and agents are immune to requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Contractors may hire subcontractors, and those subcontracts are not disclosed to the public. Important aspects of a contractor‟s work may be buried in work orders that are never published in any form. Further, Treasury publishes no information on the performance of contractors during the life of thecontract. In short, as work moves farther and farther from Treasury‟s direct control, it becomes less and less transparent and thus impedes accountability. The contracting process has also created confusion about the role of small businesses in administering the TARP. In one case, Treasury awarded a contract to a “small disadvantaged business,” which in turn delegated roughly 80 percent of the contract to a “large business.” Thus, although on the surface it appears that the contract is being performed by a small business, in actuality a large business is essentially responsible for performance. Additionally, the Panel is concerned by the lack of outreach by Treasury to find qualified minority-owned businesses to participate in the TARP. Although several minority-owned businesses have received TARP financial agency agreements, only one prime TARP contract has been awarded to a minority- owned business. Here is new COP Chair Sen. Ted Kaufman (D-DE), summarizing the report: Read the COP October report, in full, here .

In its latest study of the impact of the federal government's bailout efforts the Congressional Oversight Panel looks beyond US borders. The COP August report focuses on the international impact of TARP, and finds that US rescue efforts provided some significant benefits overseas. From the report: Faced with the possible collapse of their most important financial institutions, many national governments intervened. One of the main components of the U.S. response was the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which pumped capital into financial institutions, guaranteed billions of dollars in debt and troubled assets, and directly purchased assets. The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve offered further support by allowing banks to borrow cheaply from the government and by guaranteeing selected pools of assets. Other nations‟ interventions used the same basic set of policy tools, but with a key difference: While the United States attempted to stabilize the system by flooding money into as many banks as possible – including those that had significant overseas operations – most other nations targeted their efforts more narrowly toward institutions that in many cases had no major U.S. operations. As a result, it appears likely that America‟s financial rescue had a much greater impact internationally than other nations‟ programs had on the United States. This outcome was likely inevitable given the structure of the TARP, but if the U.S. government had gathered more information about which countries‟ institutions would most benefit from some of its actions, it might have been able to ask those countries to share the pain of rescue. For example, banks in France and Germany were among the greatest beneficiaries of AIG‟s rescue, yet the U.S. government bore the entire $70 billion risk of the AIG capital injection program. The U.S. share of this single rescue exceeded the size of France‟s entire $35 billion capital injection program and was nearly half the size of Germany‟s $133 billion program. COP Chair Elizabeth Warren discusses the report's key findings: Read the full report here .

Members of the Congressional Oversight Panel --tasked by Congress to provide oversight of the Treasury Department's actions in managing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)--"applaud" what they see as Treasury's improved response to the foreclosure crisis, but say that "even now Treasury’s programs are not keeping pace with the foreclosure crisis." Here's an excerpt from COP's latest monthly report: Despite Treasury’s efforts, foreclosures have continued at a rapid pace. In total, 2.8 million homeowners received a foreclosure notice in 2009. Each foreclosure has imposed costs not only on borrowers and lenders but also indirectly on neighboring homeowners, cities and towns, and the broader economy. These foreclosures have driven down home prices, trapping even more borrowers in a home that is worth less than what they owe. In fact, nearly one in four homeowners with a mortgage is presently underwater. Although housing prices have begun to stabilize in many regions, home values in several metropolitan areas, such as Las Vegas and Miami, continue to fall sharply. Treasury’s response continues to lag well behind the pace of the crisis. As of February 2010, only 168,708 homeowners have received final, five-year loan modifications – a small fraction of the 6 million borrowers who are presently 60+ days delinquent on their loans. For every borrower who avoided foreclosure through HAMP last year, another 10 families lost their homes. It now seems clear that Treasury’s programs, even when they are fully operational, will not reach the overwhelming majority of homeowners in trouble. Treasury’s stated goal is for HAMP (Home Affordable Modification Program) to offer loan modifications to 3 to 4 million borrowers, but only some of these offers will result in temporary modifications, and only some of those modifications will convert to final, five-year status. Even among borrowers who receive five-year modifications, some will eventually fall behind on their payments and once again face foreclosure. In the final reckoning, the goal itself seems small in comparison to the magnitude of the problem. COP Chair Elizabeth Warren introduces the April report in this video: Read the full report here .

Bloomberg has released the results of a new national poll on Americans' attitudes toward Wall Street, bankers, and regulation of financial institutions. The poll shows that Americans are not too fond of anyone at this moment::bankers, insurance companies, Wall Street, corporate executives. And while they favor "punishing banks," nearly 70% say they want the government to regulate consumer protection through currently available means, rather than establish a new agency. John McCormick and Alison Vekshin report: As Democrats and Republicans seek to tap populist ire, the poll shows there may be political advantage in taking on big financial institutions such as Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America Corp. , and New York’s Goldman Sachs Group Inc. The majority of poll participants -- 56 percent -- say big financial companies are more interested in enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people, while 40 percent say such firms play a vital role in enabling the economy to grow. At the same time, Americans are divided over the scope of government regulation. More than 40 percent of Americans say the government has gone too far in measures to fix the financial industry; 37 percent say it hasn’t done enough. Almost six out of 10 people say Wall Street hasn’t gone far enough on its own to protect against future emergencies. “Anything the government gets their fingers in, they mess it up,” said poll participant Norman White, 60, a community college electronics instructor who lives in Colfax, Louisiana . “I don’t have a very high opinion of the government running anything.” Read Wall Street Despised in Poll Showing Majority Want Regulation here .

In its February report, the Congressional Oversight Panel looks at the threat commercial real estate losses pose to financial stability. Between 2010 and 2014, about $1.4 trillion in commercial real estate loans will reach the end of their terms. Nearly half are at present ―"underwater"– that is, the borrower owes more than the underlying property is currently worth. Commercial property values have fallen more than 40 percent since the beginning of 2007. Increased vacancy rates, which now range from eight percent for multifamily housing to 18 percent for office buildings, and falling rents, which have declined 40 percent for office space and 33 percent for retail space, have exerted a powerful downward pressure on the value of commercial properties. The largest commercial real estate loan losses are projected for 2011 and beyond; losses at banks alone could range as high as $200-$300 billion. The stress tests conducted last year for 19 major financial institutions examined their capital reserves only through the end of 2010. Even more significantly, small and mid-sized banks were never subjected to any exercise comparable to the stress tests, despite the fact that small and mid-sized banks are proportionately even more exposed than their larger counterparts to commercial real estate loan losses. The report goes on to point out that the larger danger comes if there are widespread defaults and we see hotels, stores, and office complexes closing. All of that would have a direct negative impact on jobs. COP Chair Elizabeth Warren discusses the dangers in her monthly report: Read the full February COP report here .