Harvard Kennedy School professor Jeff Frankel , director of the Program in International Finance and Macroeconomics at the National Bureau of Economic Research , has an interesting look at the popularity of Chile's outgoing president, Michelle Bachelet . Bachelet and her administration were deeply unpopular in the summer of 2008--pulling the lowest approval ratings of and leaders of Chile since "the return of democracy," according to Frankel. But with the global economic crisis came newfound appreciation for Bachelet and her economic policies. Frankel calls those policies--in which the government resisted spending off its commodity (mainly copper) assets during boom times, then spent the savings during the global recession--"a truly countercyclical fiscal policy." And he says Chile, which just joined the OECD, essentially moving out of the "developing nation" category, provides a strong example for other developing nations: Under the Chilean rules, the government can run a deficit larger than the target to the extent that: (1) output falls short of potential, in a recession, or (2) the price of copper is below its medium-term (10-year) equilibrium, with the key institutional innovation that there are two panels of experts whose job it is each mid-year to make the judgments, respectively, what is the output gap and what is the medium term equilibrium price of copper. Thus in the copper boom of 2003-2008 when, as usual, the political pressure was to declare the increase in the price of copper permanent thereby justifying spending on a par with export earnings, the expert panel ruled that most of the price increase was temporary so that most of the earnings had to be saved. This turned out to be right, as the 2008 spike was indeed temporary. Any country, but especially commodity-producers, could usefully apply variants of the Chilean fiscal device. Given that many developing countries are more prone to weak institutions (Greece comes to mind), a useful reinforcement of the Chilean idea would be to give legal independence to the panels. There could a requirement regarding the professional qualifications of the members and laws protecting them from being fired, as there are for governors of independent central banks. The principle of a separation of decision-making powers should be retained: the rules as interpreted by the panels determine the total amount of spending or budget deficits, while the elected political leaders determine how that total is allocated. This may be just the sort of structural reform needed in so many countries where the politicians have repeatedly proven themselves unable to maintain long-term budgetary discipline. Read Achieving Long-Term Fiscal Discipline: A Lesson from Chile here . (Hat tip: Mark Thoma)