Martin Feldstein calls Greece's mix of overwhelming government debt and a free-falling economy an "otherwise impossible situation." Greece will default, as Feldstein argues that is the only way out. But after it defaults, will it leave the euro zone? Having its own currency just might open more options.
Feldstein argues there are two reasons that the key influencers in the Euro zone (Germany and France) do not want Greece to leave. At least not just yet. From Project Syndicate:
First, the banks and other financial institutions in Germany and France have large exposures to Greek government debt, both directly and through the credit that they have extended to Greek and other eurozone banks. Postponing a default gives the French and German financial institutions time to build up their capital, reduce their exposure to Greek banks by not renewing credit when loans come due, and sell Greek bonds to the European Central Bank.
The second, and more important, reason for the Franco-German struggle to postpone a Greek default is the risk that a Greek default would induce sovereign defaults in other countries and runs on other banking systems, particularly in Spain and Italy. This risk was highlighted by the recent downgrade of Italy’s credit rating by Standard & Poor’s.
A default by either of those large countries would have disastrous implications for the banks and other financial institutions in France and Germany. The European Financial Stability Fund is large enough to cover Greece’s financing needs but not large enough to finance Italy and Spain if they lose access to private markets. So European politicians hope that by showing that even Greece can avoid default, private markets will gain enough confidence in the viability of Italy and Spain to continue lending to their governments at reasonable rates and financing their banks.
Read Europe’s High-Risk Gamble here.
Posted
09-28-2011 9:28 AM
by
Graham Griffith
Filed under: finance, GDP, banks, debt, Europe, Euro Zone, currencies, euro, Greece, default, Greece bailout, sovereign debt, martin feldstein